From Disengagement to Intervention: The Chinese Civil War, Korean War, and the
Paradigm Shift of the U.S. Foreign Policy in East Asia

Hosung Jung
Dr. Benjamin Wetzel
HIS 130
Apr 18, 2022

1
On the brink of the Cold War, two wars formed the geopolitical terrain of East Asia after
1945: the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949) and Korean War (1950-1953). The former led to the
emergence of united China under the Communist rule, while the latter shaped what may be
called the Cold War Order in East Asia by solidifying the separation of North and South Korea,
as well as the Mainland China and Taiwan. As the United States emerged as a major player in
East Asia after the fall of the Japanese Empire, it was substantially involved in both wars.
However, America showed quite contrasting foreign policies in each war. Whereas the U.S.
constantly refused to intervene militarily in the Chinese Civil War at all, it did so on a large-scale
in Korea. It chose to abandon China but decided to rescue Korea. The United States displayed an
opposite attitude and policy in the Korean War which broke out just a short time after the
Chinese Civil War. Why was this so? This paper aims to reply to this question by analyzing the
factors that affected the U.S. decision-making in respective wars. It should be argued that while
the U.S. disengagement in China was due to its pre-Cold War policy maintained in spite of the
impending Cold War reality, the following intervention in Korea signified a paradigm shift of the
U.S. East Asia policy to the Cold War interventionism.
As General Marshall assessed, the moribund Nationalist government would not be able to
win the civil war in China unless the United States intervened with a direct, large-scale military
force, including the ground ones.1 However, such a policy of direct intervention was never
adopted or even considered throughout the war. Remarkably, even the critics of Harry Truman
administration’s China policy, the supporters of Chiang Kai-shek in the Congress as well as the
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“China bloc” in the State Department, who would pressure the administration for more aid and
support for the Nationalist government, did not dare suggest such an option.2
In fact, the U.S. government indeed had no intention of intervening in the Chinese Civil
War even before the conflict actually began. President Truman himself had made it clear in his
statement on United States Policy toward China on December 15, 1945, that in spite of the U.S.
recognition and support for the Nationalist government of China, the “U. S. support will not
extend to U.S. military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife.”3 Such
resolution did not change in spite of the revolutionary shift of the U.S. foreign policy from the
WWII-collaboration with the Soviet Union to the Cold War strategy of containment that came in
the following years. The U.S. policy of no-intervention was a result of the pre-Cold War agenda
and it was maintained consistently regardless of what came after.
It should be asked, then, why the Truman administration did not change its initial policy
in spite of the intensification of the Cold War since 1947 and why it chose to abandon China
when it was given with only two options: an overall military intervention and total withdrawal.
According to Hee Seung Lee, five factors affected the U.S. abandonment of the Nationalist
government4: 1) Fear of casualties by engagement in a large war after World War II, as it would
have to mobilize and deploy one to two million forces to China; 2) the U.S. did not estimate that
the communized China would be a serious threat to its national security, given the far distance
between the two countries, judgment of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) autonomy from
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the Soviet directions, and the lack of hostility between the U.S. and CCP back then; 3) the
communized China was not considered a great threat to American interests; 4) While Chiang
Kai-shek’s government had strengthened ties with the Republicans during the 1948 election,
assuming Thomas Dewey’ victory, Truman got re-elected and refused the request for aid; 5) the
spread of anti-American sentiment in China and the incompetence and corruption of the
Nationalist government discouraged the U.S. intervention.
Tang Tsou also lists a number of similar elements for the U.S. refraining from
intervention in China. On the brink of the Civil War, what discouraged the intervention was the
misjudgment of the nature and intention of the CCP shared by some of the high officials of the
State Department, at least until late 1945, that the CCP was something other than dedicated
communists guided by Russia.5 Though such a wishful misperception rapidly declined thereafter,
the incompetence of the Nationalist government and its obstinate resistance against American
advice for reform discouraged any moral cause for intervention.6 For example, in 1949, an
American consul general reported that Americans in Tientsin, the key port in North China, felt
like “our global policy of opposition to Communism should not oblige us to support a hopelessly
inefficient and corrupt government which has lost the support of its people.”7 Plus, the U.S.
belief that its intervention could not be justified unless Soviets overtly intervened or supported
Chinese communists, as well as its fear of Soviet intervention, also thwarted the military
intervention option.8
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Not only that, the beginning and intensification of the Cold War in Europe further
discouraged and practically disabled the U.S. intervention to China, given America’s finite
resources and military capabilities. As Tang Tsou pointed out, the “events in China moved
toward a climax during America’s intensified struggle with the Soviet Union over the fate of
Europe [e.g. the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, Berlin Blockade, etc.] …Confronted with
historic tasks in Europe and a hopeless situation in China, the administration steadfastly adhered
to its decision against armed intervention and the related decision against any action which
would degenerate into armed intervention.”9 American resources had to be concentrated in
Europe since 1947 and the limited tolerance of the Congress and the public for costly programs
made Washington's choice on how much resources should be allotted to what part of the world
even more difficult.10 Plus, not to mention the military postulate shared by George Marshall (who
served as the United States Special Envoy to China in 1945-1947 and then the Secretary of the
State from 1947 to 1949), the Congress, and the State Department officials that American ground
forces should never be used for combat in China,11America was indeed incapable of deploying
large ground forces to the battlefields in China due to rapid demobilization after WWII.12 In
1948, when the Nationalist government was clearly facing imminent collapse without an active
external intervention, “the actual strength of the army and airforce was only 898,000 men with
140,000 deployed in the Far East.”13
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Whereas the United States steadfastly maintained the principle of no intervention during
the Chinese Civil War and let the Communists take over the country, it showed a contrasting
policy towards the Korean War which broke out just a year after the end of the other: a rapid
commitment of American forces to Korea. It took only six days after the outbreak of the war for
the United States to decide intervention with ground combat forces. How could such a drastic
reversal of the U.S. foreign policy take place in such a quick time? It is even more surprising
given that the United States had created an impression to the world that it was going to abandon
Korea by pulling out the U.S. forces from the country in 1949, “the public exclusion of the
country from the Pacific defense perimeter by Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the open
admission of the peninsula’s indefensibility by Senator Connally, the chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.”14
Since the North Korean invasion began at 3 p.m. on June 24, 1950 (Eastern Time), the
first official report by John Muccio, the American ambassador in Korea, reached the State
Department at 9:26 p.m.15 At 10:30 p.m., Muccio’s cable was reported to Secretary Acheson,
who telephoned President Truman in Independence, Missouri in less than an hour.16 As Glenn
Paige says, “the officials at the State Department, the President, and the Secretary of State had all
agreed immediately that the correct initial response to the North Korean invasion should be to
bring it to the attention of the United Nations.”17 Thus, at the request of the U. S. government,
the Security Council of the United Nations was convened the next day which passed the
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resolution calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the North
Korean armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel.18
Meanwhile, President Truman, who came back to Washington on June 25, presided over
the first conference at the Blair House with the nation’s top diplomatic and military leaders.
There was the consensus that “the Soviet Union was using its Korean satellite as a pawn and
probably was still not ready to wage a global war,”19 and it was decided to provide arms and
equipment for the South Korean armed forces via General Douglass MacArthur, to protect the
evacuation of Americans with the Air Force, and to send the Seventh Fleet to Taiwan Strait to
prevent any conflict in the area. 20 Virtually, it was the decision to intervene and the subsequent
decisions were made in alignment with the result of the first Blair House conference.21
As the situation worsened on 26th, the second conference took place and the President
approved Secretary Acheson’s recommendations which included the authorization of the Air
Force and the Navy activities to give full support to the South Koreans below 38th parallel and
the proposal of a new resolution at the Security Council calling on U.N. members to aid South
Korea to repel the attack and secure peace.22 The next day, 27th, the Security Council passed this
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new resolution which justified the U.S. intervention.23 Subsequently, on 29th, Truman approved
the operation of the Navy and the Air Force in northern Korea above the 38th parallel. 24
On June 29th, Tokyo time, General MacArthur himself, the Far Eastern Commander, flew
to Korea to view the situation, looking out upon the defense line made south of Seoul which had
fallen into the enemy’s hands.25 There he decided that only the commitment of the American
combat forces could prevent the invaders taking over South Korea.26 His report urging the
commitment of the ground forces was transmitted to the Pentagon at 3 a.m., June 30th, and in the
morning the same day, the President authorized MacArthur to use certain ground units under his
command.27 Thus began the largest military commitment after WWII.
One can easily observe that the United States government was generally in favor of the
intervention throughout its decision making process. What could have been motives for such
attitudes and actions? How did the United States perceive the situation in Korea that it decided to
intervene so quickly?
First of all, the decision makers of the nation, such as President Truman, understood the
North Korean invasion in terms of the international challenge of Soviet communism which, if
responded with indifference and complacency, might bring a great disaster to Western
democracies as did WWII. Coming back to Washington at the news of the War, President

23

Nam Gyun Kim, “President Truman’s Direction,” 5.

24

Nam Gyun Kim, “President Truman’s Direction,” 6.

25

Paige, The Korean Decision, 235-236.

26

Paige, The Korean Decision, 236.

27

Nam Gyun Kim, “President Truman’s Direction,” 6.

8
Truman recalled the precedents of Manchuria, Ethiopia, and Austria. 28 He believed if the Western
democracies failed again to take action and let the aggressors take over what they want, it would
further encourage them to keep moving on,29 which “would mean a third world war, just as
similar incidents had brought on the second world war.”30 Therefore, the war in Korea was not
perceived as an “internal strife,” as in China a year ago, but as a serious challenge of the Soviet
Union and the Communist bloc.
Such a view was expressed by the members of the first Blair House conference. General
Omar Bradley remarked that Russia was “obviously testing” the United States in Korea, and
President Truman also said that the Russians were gambling that America “would be afraid of
starting a third world war and would offer no resistance.”31 In his statement on June 27, Truman
said that the “attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed
beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion
and war.”32
That the American leaders understood the invasion in an international context explains
some of the first measures they had taken: deployment of the Seventh Fleet to Taiwan strait,
acceleration of military aid to Philippine and French Indochina.33 This indicates that the
containment strategy, which had been usually applied only to European theater by far, now began
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to be implemented in Asia as well. 34 However underestimated the strategic importance of the
Korean peninsula had been, the perception of the nature of the attack made the land vital to the
U.S. interest, as it concerned the American credibility everywhere else. 35 Thus, the Korean War
brought the full implementation of the containment policy in East Asia, and it would signal the
beginning of the American policy of active intervention in the region for the following years.
In summary, the Chinese Civil War and Korean War swept East Asia after the fall of the
Japanese Empire and brought about the new Cold War order in the region. The contrasting U.S.
approaches to the respective wars are a good example that snapshots the paradigm shift of the
U.S. foreign policy in the region from collaboration with the communist bloc (i.e. Soviet Union)
to containment during the interim period between WWII and the intense Cold War in the 1950s.
The basic principles of the U.S. policy regarding the Chinese Civil War was outlined and
structured by the end of WWII. Though substantially due to the war’s civil and internal nature,
the United States maintained those principles despite pressures of the impending Cold War. On
the contrary, the U.S. policy in the Korean War, which broke out when the Cold War had already
taken place, was structured on the existing containment strategy, based on the Cold War mindset
of conflict, and impacted the future U.S. policy toward the region. It precipitated the return of the
U.S. to the region it had seemed to withdraw from. Thus the two consecutive wars show an
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extreme reversal of the U.S. foreign policy in East Asia from disengagement to intervention
which has led to its strong presence in the region since then.
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